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PREVENTING SPARKS IN 
SMOLDERING ASHES: USING 
SWEDEN’S INTERNET LAW TO 
COMBAT INCENDIARY SPEECH IN 
THE SCANDINAVIAN ONLINE 
COMMUNITY 
And the people under the sky were also very much the same—
everywhere, all over the world, hundreds or thousands of millions of 
people just like this, people ignorant of one another’s existence, held 
apart by walls of hatred and lies, and yet almost exactly the same—
people who had never learned to think but were storing up in their 
hearts and bellies and muscles the power that would one day overturn 
the world.1 
INTRODUCTION 
n July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik, a thirty-two-year-old 
Norwegian man, confessed to carrying out a violent rampage that 
left seventy-seven of his countrymen dead.2 Before surrendering to po-
lice, Breivik detonated a bomb in central Oslo, and then traveled to a po-
litical youth camp on the island of Utøya, where he, dressed as a police 
officer, used a machine gun to shoot sixty-nine campers, many of them 
young members of Norway’s Labor Party.3 Within hours, a portrait of the 
killer emerged: “[T]he man behind the worst attack on Norway since the 
second world war . . . [was] a Christian fundamentalist with a deep ha-
tred of multiculturalism, of the left and of Muslims, who had written dis-
paragingly of prominent Norwegian politicians.”4 
In the wake of Breivik’s attacks, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stol-
tenberg urged his countrymen to reflect on “what we have thought, said 
and written,” and that, “We all have something to learn from the trag-
                                                                                                         
 1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 181 (1949). 
 2. Malin Rising & Bjoern H. Amland, Anders Behring Breivik, Norway Killer, Re-
mains in Detention, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/19/anders-behring-breivik-
detention_n_969900.html. 
 3. Id.; see also Terrorofrene på Utøya og i Oslo [The Terrorist Attacks on Utøya 
Island and Oslo], VG NETT, http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/oslobomben/ofre/ (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
 4. Peter Beaumont, Anders Behring Breivik: Profile of a Mass Murderer, GUARDIAN 
(July 23, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/23/anders-behring-breivik-
norway-attacks. 
O 
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edy.”5 Meanwhile, Erik Hellsborn, a member of the anti-immigrant Swe-
den Democrats party, blogged, “In a Norwegian Norway this tragedy 
would never have happened . . . . This was caused by multiculturalism.”6 
In fact, Breivik left behind a 1500-page manifesto, in which he calls for 
an end to “the multiculturalist regime of Norway.”7 Moreover, a week 
before his attacks, Breivik registered a Twitter account and sent off a 
single tweet: “One person with a belief is equal to the force of 100,000 
who have only interests.”8 
With the proliferation of right-wing, anti-immigrant political parties in 
Scandinavia9—specifically the Sweden Democrats,10 Norway’s Progress 
Party,11 and the Danish People’s Party12—the personal statements by 
                                                                                                         
 5. Tony Paterson & Charlotte Sundberg, Norway’s Premier Urges a New Tone in 
Public Debate, INDEP. (Aug. 2, 2011), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/norways-premier-urges-a-new-tone-in-
public-debate-2330216.html. 
 6. Mark Townsend & Ian Traynor, In Focus: How the far right’s web of influence 
created a killer, OBSERVER (July 31, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/30/norway-attacks-anders-behring-breivik. 
 7. Norway shooting: quotes from Anders Behring Breivik’s online manifesto, 
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 19, 2011),  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/8657727/Norway-shooting-
quotes-from-Anders-Behring-Breiviks-online-manifesto.html. In his manifesto, Breivik 
takes on the pseudonym of Andrew Berwick, and claims the title of “Justiciar Knight 
Commander for Knights Templar Europe and one of several leaders of the National and 
pan-European Patriotic Resistance Movement.” Id. 
 8. Beaumont, supra note 4. 
 9. While some colloquially refer to Scandinavia as including Iceland and Finland, 
traditionally Scandinavia includes only Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. Scandinavia, 
BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPÆDIA (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/526461/Scandinavia. For the purposes of 
this Note, I will refer to Scandinavia as only including Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. 
 10. The Sweden Democrats Party was formed in 1988, as an offspring of the Sweden 
Party and the Keep Sweden Swedish party. Vårt parti [Our Party], 
SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA.SE, http://sverigedemokraterna.se/vart-parti/ (last visited June 8, 
2012); see infra text accompanying note 44. 
 11. Norway’s Progress Party was formed in 1973 in response to increased social wel-
fare programs. Tor Bjørklund & Jørgen Goul Andersen, Anti-Immigration Parties in 
Denmark and Norway, in SHADOWS OVER EUROPE 107, 108 (Martin Schain, Aristide 
Zolberg & Patrick Hossay eds., 2002). Coinciding with a spike in asylum-seekers in the 
1980s, the Progress Party shifted from its anti-tax platform to immigration reform. Id. at 
113; ELIZABETH CARTER, THE EXTREME RIGHT IN WESTERN EUROPE 31–32 (2005) (“Im-
migration has also become the most important policy area for the Danish and Norwegian 
right-wing extremist parties in more recent years.”). 
 12. The Danish People’s Party was formed in 1995 as faction of the Danish Progress 
Party and eventually as its successor when the Progress Party collapsed in 1998. Bjørk-
lund & Andersen, supra note 11, at 107. With its initial anti-tax platform, the Danish 
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party members have been characterized by the media and civic society 
groups as fostering extremism and, in some cases, inciting violence and 
hatred.13 Officially these political parties focus on issues stemming from 
mass immigration and asylum grants, including increased drugs and 
crime rates, welfare costs, and cultural clashes such as female genital 
mutilation, forced marriage, and radicalization.14 However, a significant 
anti-multicultural blogosphere is growing, in which hate and violence are 
celebrated and encouraged.15 
This Note argues that the Swedish legislature should enforce their hate 
speech legislation against illegal online activity. In particular, the Swed-
ish government should require Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) to fil-
ter content that constitutes hate speech, including all content traveling 
through their telecommunications systems infrastructure. In the wake of 
these tragic events, all the Scandinavian countries need to confront the 
threat of hate speech with open eyes. Given its geographic location and 
the technological infrastructure of the surrounding countries, the Swedish 
government is in a key position to address the threat of incendiary 
speech. Because hate speech is particularly pernicious, increased regula-
tion is necessary in order to uphold the cultural values of Scandinavian 
society. 
This Note explores the limits of freedom of speech in the online com-
munity and the extent of the law in controlling these forums, in reference 
to the outpouring of radical right-wing bloggers in Scandinavia and the 
anti-immigration platforms they promulgate. Part I of this Note provides 
background information on the current political climate in Scandinavia, 
paying particular attention to Norway and Sweden, and discusses exist-
ing instruments of international law. Part II illustrates the shortcomings 
of current legislation in Scandinavia, using Breivik’s manifesto as a lens 
through which to examine the proliferation of hate speech in Scandina-
via. Part III proposes a multilateral approach to bridge the gap in the law 
between hate speech legislation and online enforcement, and provides the 
rationale for curbing freedom of expression in certain online forums. 
                                                                                                         
Progress Party inspired the formation of the Norwegian Progress Party and witnessed a 
similar shift in platform in response to increased immigration in the mid-1980s. Id. at 
113. Political scientists have characterized both the Danish People’s Party and the Nor-
wegian Progress Party as right-wing extremist parties whose racist platforms are “of the 
culturist kind.” CARTER, supra note 11, at 39 (citing Andreas Widfeldt, Scandinavia: 
Mixed Success for the Populist Right, 53 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 486, 491 (2000)). 
 13. Nicholas Kulish, Norway Attacks Put Spotlight on Rise of Right-Wing Sentiment 
in Europe, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/world/europe/24europe.html?pagewanted=all. 
 14. Townsend & Traynor, supra note 6. 
 15. Id. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Changing Makeup of the Land 
Immigration has effectively addressed two problems facing the Euro-
pean labor market: a smaller workforce caused by a lower birthrate and 
an aging population across Europe, and a need to fill jobs that Europeans 
are not willing to perform at the going rate.16 As a result of generous asy-
lum laws and an even more generous welfare system,17 Sweden’s for-
eign-born population rate reached 13.4% in 2007.18 Similarly, Norway’s 
foreign-born population has reached 10%.19 Because many of these im-
migrants are willing to work at a lower wage than native Europeans, they 
represent a stabilizing force in the labor economy.20 
However, their presence does not come without controversy. In fact, 
current sentiment across Europe is that there are simultaneously too 
many and too few people, or as one scholar put it, Europe is plagued with 
“demographic bulimia.”21 Many native Europeans protest the lowered 
wages and increased unemployment within the native population that 
                                                                                                         
 16. CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE 34, 39 
(2009). As Christopher Caldwell writes, “Today Europe’s population is aging, its support 
ratio is shrinking and due to falling birthrates, there is no sufficiently large ‘next genera-
tion’ of workers to restore it to balance.” Id. at 39. In fact, according to a study by the 
United Nations, Europe needs an annual net immigration of 1.4 million people per year in 
order to meet its labor requirements. Herbert Brücker, Joachim R. Frick & Gert G. Wag-
ner, Economic Consequences of Immigration in Europe, in IMMIGRATION AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 111, 136 (Craig A. Parson & Timothy M. Smeeding eds., 
2006) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION]. For example, in Sweden, the fertility rate between 
2000 and 2005 was 1.64 births per 1,000 people, and in 2003, the natural population 
growth was 0.7%. Id. at 12 tbl.1.4 (citing data from United Nations). To put this figure in 
perspective, the United States had a total fertility rate of 2.04. Id. at 3 tbl.1.1 (citing data 
from Eurostat). 
 17. Georg Menz, “Useful” Gastarbeiter, burdensome asylum seekers, and the second 
wave of welfare retrenchment: Exploring the nexus between migration and the welfare 
state, in IMMIGRATION, supra note 16, at 407–10. 
 18. Country Statistical Profile: Sweden 2010, OECD ILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-sweden-2010_20752288-2010-table-
swe;jsessionid=mqsh595d1ixh.delta (last updated May 27, 2010). 
 19. Norway—Breivik Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/b/anders_behring_breivik/i
ndex.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2012) (“Immigration has skyrocketed by a factor of five 
since the early 1970s—more than 10 percent of Norway’s population is of foreign origin. 
In recent years, the biggest groups of asylum seekers have come from Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Somalia and Eritrea.”). 
 20. Brücker, Frick & Wagner, supra note 16, at 112. 
 21. CALDWELL, supra note 16, at 39–41 (quoting HANS MAGNUS ENZENBERGER, DIE 
GROßE WANDERUNG 31 (1992)). 
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accompany increases in immigration.22 Given the strong welfare pro-
grams in the Scandinavian countries, immigrants are also characterized 
as a “welfare drain.”23 Moreover, just because a country is diverse does 
not mean its society is integrated. In fact, Sweden has been called “the 
country with the most intractable segregation.”24 
But cultural differences and economics are not the only factors that 
fuel anti-immigration sentiment. Remarkably, in 2003, 69% of all Euro-
peans surveyed believed that “immigrants make crime ‘worse.’”25 How-
ever, this belief has been characterized as inaccurate,26 and in 2011, the 
                                                                                                         
 22. Brücker, Frick & Wagner, supra note 16, at 112. “Unemployment has also fre-
quently been linked to hostility against immigrants. It has been suggested that marginal-
ized groups, not least the unemployed, are particularly inclined to blame immigrants 
themselves for their problems.” Bjørklund & Andersen, supra note 11, at 116–17. 
 23. In part, economic concerns over the “welfare drain” are not unfounded: there is a 
noticeable difference in employment rates between Swedish and non-Swedish citizens, 
with 78% of Swedish males and 74.2% of females working versus only 63.1% and 60.3% 
of their non-Swedish counterparts, respectively. Menz, supra note 16, at 407–10. This 
difference is even starker when you isolate the non-European migrants in Sweden, who 
have an overall employment rate of only 55%. Id. In a country whose generous welfare 
system is based on a social contract that involves labor contribution, these differences do 
not go unnoticed. Id. This said, the fact that the majority of immigrants coming to Nor-
way and Sweden are asylum seekers—many of whom are coming from countries with 
civil unrest—can also provide clarity in the discrepancies in employment rates. Amanda 
Billner, Regeringen vill jämna ut jobbklyfta, DAGENS NYHETER (May 30, 2011, 6:38 PM), 
http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/regeringen-vill-jamna-ut-jobbklyfta. 
 24. CALDWELL, supra note 16, at 246. Cultural differences have become intensified 
by the current segregation. Id. According to the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 
the estimated Muslim population in Sweden in 2010 is 451,000, or 4.9% of the country’s 
population of 9.4 million. The Future of the Global Muslim Population, PEW FORUM ON 
RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (Jan. 2011), http://pewforum.org/future-of-the-global-muslim-
population-regional-europe.aspx#ftn39_rtn; see also SWEDEN.SE, www.sweden.se (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2012). Similarly, Norway’s Muslim population is 144,000, or 3.0% of 
their population of 4.9 million, and 12.2% of their population is foreign-born. Id. Steven 
Erlanger & Michael Schwirtz, In Norway, Consensus Cuts 2 Ways, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/world/europe/29norway.html?pagewanted=all; 
Norway After Terrorism: Flowers for Freedom, ECON. (July 30, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21524852. 
 25. Jack Citrin & John Sides, European Immigration in the People’s Court, in 
IMMIGRATION, supra note 16, at 327, 334 (citing 2002–2003 European Social Survey). 
 26. Hur många av dem som begår brott är invandrare? [How Many of Those Who 
Commit Crime Are Immigrants?], BROTTSFÖREBYGGANDE RÅDET (Feb. 8, 2006), 
http://www.bra.se/extra/pod/?action=pod_show&id=85&module_instance=15; see also 
MICHELLE HALE WILLIAMS, THE IMPACT OF RADICAL RIGHT-WING PARTIES IN WEST 
EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES 63 (2006) (“The lack of a direct correlation on the socioeco-
nomic variables supports the argument that backing for radical right-wing parties has less 
to do with real conditions in European societies and more to do with perceived circum-
stances.”). 
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Swedish government published an article rebuffing common “myths” 
about immigration.27 
B. Proliferation of Political Parties Opposing Immigration 
As this “demographic bulimia” becomes epidemic, Europe has experi-
enced a wave of public opinion opposing immigration and multicultural-
ism.28 In particular, prominent political parties have embraced these sen-
timents, imbued them into their platforms, and now wield significant 
force in the Scandinavian political arena.29 The Sweden Democrats, 
Norway’s Progress Party, and the Danish People’s Party all hold seats in 
their respective parliamentary bodies.30 In fact, at the time of Breivik’s 
attacks, the Progress Party was the second-largest party in Norway.31 
Similarly, the Sweden Democrats currently hold twenty seats out of a 
total of 349 in the parliamentary body, the Riksdag,32 and the People’s 
                                                                                                         
 27. Vanliga nätmyter om invandrare och minoriteter [Common Myths about Immi-
grants and Minorities], REGERINGSKANSLIET (Nov. 30, 2011), 
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2279/a/181576. 
 28. Ross Douthat, A Right-Wing Monster, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/opinion/25douthat.html. “Mass immigration really 
has left the Continent more divided than enriched, Islam and liberal democracy have not 
yet proven natural bedfellows and the dream of a postnational, postpatriotic European 
Union governed by a benevolent ruling elite looks more like a folly every day.” Id. 
 29. Bjørklund & Andersen, supra note 11, at 112. 
 30. See infra notes 31–33. 
 31. Erlanger & Schwirtz, supra note 24. In the election held just seven weeks after 
Breivik’s attacks, the Progress Party was displaced by the Conservative Party for the 
second seat. Norway: Losses for the Right Wing, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/world/europe/norway-losses-for-the-right-
wing.html. With the Labor Party winning 33.2% of the vote, the Progress Party decreased 
from 18.5% of the vote in 2007, to 11.8% of the vote on September 14, 2011. Id. The 
Norwegian government has a 165-member legislative body called the Storting, whose 
members are elected through a direct proportional vote. Patrick Hossay, Country Profiles, 
in SHADOWS OVER EUROPE, supra note 11, at 322. 
 32. Election 2010, RIKSDAG, 
http://www.riksdagen.se/templates/R_Page____775.aspx (last updated Sept. 20, 2010). 
The Swedish government is comprised of a unicameral legislature, called the Riksdag, 
whose members are directly elected by the people through a proportional representation 
system. Hossay, supra note 31, at 339–40. The elections are held among Sweden’s 
twenty-nine regional electoral constituencies, and in order to gain seats in the Riksdag, a 
political party must surpass the four percent threshold of the national vote, or obtain 12% 
of the vote in any regional constituency. Id.; SWEDISH INST., FACTS ABOUT SWEDEN: 
GOVERNMENT 2 (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.sweden.se/upload/Sweden_se/english/factsheets/SI/SI_FS55z_The_Swedish_
System_of_Government/FS21-The-Swedish-system-of-government-low-resolution.pdf; 
see also CARTER, supra note 11, at 149, 150 tbl.5.1. 
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Party holds twenty-four seats of a total 179 in the Danish Folketing.33 In 
order to garner more widespread support and political legitimacy, radical 
right-wing parties purify their rhetoric to conform to the limits of main-
stream politics.34 The official platforms of these parties are often limited 
to carefully constructed discourse emphasizing the impact of immigra-
tion.35 Funneling issues such as unemployment, education disparity, 
crime, and diminishing social values into a single platform, these parties 
argue that an end to immigration will solve many of the country’s socio-
economic concerns.36 
However, the members—and in many cases, even the leaders—of 
these political parties have expressed individual opinions that do not dis-
guise their anti-Muslim and anti-immigration, and often racist and xeno-
phobic, thoughts.37 They have crossed the line of acceptable political 
                                                                                                         
 33. Who’s who in the Folketing and the government, FOLKETINGET (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Publications/Who%20is%20who%20in%20the%20F
olketing%20and%20the%20government.aspx. The Danish government is comprised of a 
unicameral legislature, called the Folketing, whose members are elected through a com-
plicated proportional representation system. Hossay, supra note 31, at 332, 340. In order 
to gain seats in the Folketing, a political party must cross a threshold of two percent of 
the national vote. Id. 
 34. Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg & Patrick Hossay, Democracy in Peril?, in 
SHADOWS OVER EUROPE, supra note 11, at 301, 312 [hereinafter Schain et al., Democracy 
in Peril?]. This can be a methodical process: 
As the extreme right cleans up its image to gain electoral credibility and sup-
port, it is likely to (1) moderate its rhetoric and program toward a populist but 
less atavistic alternative; (2) be a more appealing partner to the center right; and 
(3) inspire additional efforts by more centrist politicians to usurp the populist-
nationalist mantle. 
Id. at 312. 
 35. SHADOWS OVER EUROPE, supra note 11, at 60. 
The genius or madness of the radical right wing appears to be their innovation 
at creating a climate of fear upon which their omnibus issue, immigration feeds 
. . . . Skillfully, they spin the issue to show how governments refuse to address 
it, placing themselves in the vacuum holding solutions: the radical right wing to 
the rescue. 
Id. 
 36. WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 60. 
 37. Furthermore, xenophobic speech has so permeated political discourse that it is 
now accepted as part of the anti-immigration platform. Bjørklund & Andersen, supra 
note 11, at 112. For instance, in 1997, Thomas Behnke, a member of the Danish Progress 
Party, suggested that Somalian refugees be repatriated “by parachute.” Id. at 114. The 
Danish People’s Party is even more extreme in its view of nationalism, specifically that 
welfare should be limited to Danish citizens and that multiethnicity is “a threat to national 
culture.” Id. While these sentiments are not examples of hate speech that must be limited 
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speech in their public appearances or in writing on their personal blogs. 
“The climate of fear surrounding immigration appears to have come 
about as a result of radical right-wing posturing. Fears have been inflated 
beyond what the realities of conditions ought to produce.”38 Pia Kjaers-
gaard, the leader of the Danish People’s Party, described the arrival of 
“thousands of persons who apparently civilisationally [sic], culturally 
and spiritually live in the year 1005 instead of 2005.”39 In 2009, Siv Jen-
sen, the leader of the Progress Party, used the phrase “stealth Islamiza-
tion” to refer to efforts at multiculturalism,40 and stated “we must put a 
stop to that.”41 Moreover, in May 2011, Christian Tybring-Gjedde, the 
head of the Oslo branch of the Progress Party, characterized Muslims as 
by nature more aggressive than Norwegians.42 Tybring-Gjedde has lik-
ened Muslim parents dressing their children in a hijab to dressing them in 
a Ku Klux Klan robe.43 
In the context of the proliferation of hate speech by right-wing extrem-
ist parties, the historical background of these groups is relevant to the 
study. While native Scandinavians might be reluctant to admit it, xeno-
phobic sentiment is not a new phenomenon stemming from increased 
immigration and multiculturalism in their region.44 Scrutiny reveals that 
                                                                                                         
by the law, they are indicative of the direction that politics are moving and are notewor-
thy. 
 38. WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 61. 
 39. The Growth of Islamophobia: Can Careless Talk Cost Lives?, ECON. (July 30, 
2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21524862. 
 40. Erlanger & Schwirtz, supra note 24. 
 41. Shoaib Sultan, The Muslims of Norway, FOREIGN AFF. (July 26, 2011), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67995/shoaib-sultan/the-muslims-of-norway. 
 42. Erlanger & Schwirtz, supra note 24. 
 43. Frp-politiker sammenligner hijab med Ku Klux Klan [Progress Party Politician 
Likens Hijab with KKK], VG NETT (Mar. 3, 2011, 7:31 AM), 
http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/norsk-politikk/artikkel.php?artid=593810. Signifi-
cantly, the incendiary speech that Breivik cited was not just limited to one side of the 
Atlantic. Breivik also quoted the American blogger Pamela Geller, who has written on 
her blog Atlas Shrugs that, “The Muslims have taken to rampaging, destroying and set-
ting alight the streets of France.” Tim Lister, Suspect Admired Bloggers Who Believe 
Europe is Drowning in Muslims, CNN WIRE (July 27, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-27/world/norway.terror.web_1_islamic-muslims-atlas-
shrugs?_s=PM:WORLD. Following the attacks, Geller dismissed any responsibility: “If 
anyone incited him to violence, it was Islamic supremacists. If anything incited him to 
violence, it was the Euro-Med policy.” Id. Jeffrey Goldberg criticized Geller’s dismissal: 
“Free speech means free speech. But she should be aware now that violent people look to 
her for guidance, and she should write with that in mind.” Id. 
 44. Townsend & Traynor, supra note 6. In fact, the Sweden Democrats party has their 
roots in a fascist party and had connections with neo-Nazi party members. Id.; see also 
Kulish, supra note 13. Moreover, the Sweden Democrats have until recently used the 
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the proliferation of these parties is simply a reshaping of old xenophobic 
sentiment that became socially unacceptable after World War II.45 
The universal delegitimation of right wing ideology brought on by the 
identification of World War II as a war against fascism . . . as well as 
the prohibition against blatantly xenophobic rhetoric that emerged as 
the reality of the Holocaust became public, ensured that right-wing ex-
tremists would have a very hard reception in public opinion. This “time 
in the catacombs,” as the Belgian extreme right refers to the three dec-
ades following the war, did not mark the end of an ideology; but it did 
mark its exclusion from polite, public conversation and thus its exclu-
sion from the political scene.46 
Others might say the proliferation is a response to the perceived threats 
to deeply-rooted nationalism.47 For example, one cultural anthropologist 
characterizes Norwegians as having a “quiet nationalism.”48 This said, 
“[T]here are some unexamined ugly features of Norwegian nationalism 
that have to do with ethnic nationalism, a feeling of specialness, an ele-
ment of racism. Non-ethnic Norwegians are visible and seen as out of 
place.”49 
Breivik’s attacks were not isolated incidents of violence stemming 
from xenophobic sentiment in Scandinavia. In 1995, the fatal stabbing of 
a refugee from the Ivory Coast by a sixteen-year-old Swedish neo-Nazi 
brought racially-motivated violence to the nation’s forefront.50 In a 2002 
study by the Expo Foundation,51 a Swedish Security Police analyst re-
                                                                                                         
tagline “Keep Sweden Swedish.” Øyvind Strømmen, Violent “Counter-Jihadism,” 
FOREIGN AFF. (July 27, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67999/oyvind-
strommen/violent-counter-jihadism. Similarly, the Norwegian Progress Party was 
founded by Anders Lange, an anti-communist who supported the South African apartheid 
regime. Id. 
 45. Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg & Patrick Hossay, The Development of Radical 
Right Parties in Western Europe, in SHADOWS OVER EUROPE, supra note 11, at 3 (“In-
deed, parties supporting ideologies that had been relegated to the lunatic fringe in the 
postwar period have now established a significant and enduring presence in most Western 
European states.”). 
 46. Schain et al., Democracy in Peril?, supra note 34, at 304. 
 47. Erlanger & Schwirtz, supra note 24. 
 48. Id. (quoting Thomas Hylland Eriksen, a cultural anthropologist at the University 
of Oslo who studies efforts at multiculturalism). 
 49. Id. (quoting Thomas Hylland Eriksen). 
 50. Per-Ola Ohlsson, Kand nazist tog sitt liv [Famous Nazi Took His Own Life], 
AFTONBLADET (May 2, 2001), http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article10208972.ab. 
 51. Stieg Larsson, A Study on Racially Motivated Crime and Violence, EXPO (Sept. 
2002), expo.se/www/download/final_sweden_racialviolence_raxen3.pdf. Before he be-
came the internationally acclaimed author of the Millenium triology, Larsson was a well-
known journalist and the founder of the Expo Foundation. Stieg Larsson, 1954-2004, 
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ported a considerable increase in hate crime and racial violence in Swe-
den from 1997 to 2001.52 In 2009, the Swedish Security Police released 
an additional study, finding violent extremists to pose a significant threat 
to national security.53 Similarly, in February 2011, the Norwegian Police 
Security Force published a risk analysis study concluding that right-wing 
extremists posed “no serious threat,” but that “a higher level of activity 
of some anti-Islamic groups” exists, with a greater concentration on so-
cial media websites.54 In the wake of the murder of a young boy of Gha-
naian descent by a neo-Nazi gang, the Norwegian government actively 
engaged in an anti-Nazi campaign.55 However, while this campaign has 
resulted in the significant crumbling of neo-Nazi groups in Norway, it 
has not dissipated the widespread xenophobic opinion in the online 
world.56 
C. Instruments of International Law 
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway are all members of the United Na-
tions57 and founding members of the Council of Europe.58 Sweden and 
Denmark are both member states of the European Union (“EU”), and 
thus subject to EU treaties, conventions, and directives.59 While not an 
                                                                                                         
EXPO, http://expo.se/2010/stieg-larsson-1954-2004_3515.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
The Expo Foundation was founded to “counteract the growth of the extreme right and the 
white power-culture in schools and among young people.” Id. 
 52. MIKAEL JOHANSSON, BROTTSLIGHET KOPPLAD TILL RIKETS INRE SAKERHET 2001: 
RAPPORT FRÅN SÄKERHETSPOLISEN [CRIME LINKED TO NATIONAL SECURITY 2001: 
SÄKERHETSPOLISEN REPORT] (2001), available at 
http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/18.7671d7bb110e3dcb1fd80009984/pmv2001.
pdf. The report noted that reported crimes increased from 1,752 in 1997 to 2,670 in 2001. 
Id. at 21. 
 53. SÄKERHETSPOLISEN & BROTTSFÖREBYGGANDE RÅDET, RAPPORT 2009: 15: 
VÅLDSAM POLITISK EXTREMISM [REPORT 2009: VIOLENT POLITICAL EXTREMISM] 42 
(2009), available at 
http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/18.5bf42a901201f330faf80002541/valdsampol
itiskextremism.pdf. 
 54. Strømmen, supra note 44. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. In the 2009 election, only 362 votes were cast in favor of the two remaining 
neo-Nazi parties in Norway. Id. 
 57. Member States of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS (July 3, 2006), 
http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml. 
 58. Council of Europe in Brief: 47 Countries, One Europe, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&l=en (last visited Feb. 2, 
2012). 
 59. Countries, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2012). 
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EU member state, Norway is part of Europe and cooperates closely with 
the EU, electing to participate in many EU initiatives.60 The relevant in-
ternational instruments controlling hate speech in Scandinavia include 
the European Convention on Human Rights,61 the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights,62 the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,63 and the Additional 
Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime Concerning the Criminalisa-
tion of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through 
Computer Systems.64 Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are signatories to 
each of these instruments.65 
                                                                                                         
 60. About Norway: The European Union (EU), NORWAY, 
http://www.norway.org/aboutnorway/government-and-policy/europe/policy/ (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2012). Norway is a member of the European Economic Area (“EEA”), in the 
context of being a member of European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”), or the EU 
internal market member. Id. Norway is also a member of Europol. Id. 
 61. Promulgated by the Council of Europe, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedom was enacted in 1950, in consideration of the 1948 Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. Ivan Hare, Extreme Speech Under International and 
Regional Human Rights Standards, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 62, 65–66 
(Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009) [hereinafter EXTREME SPEECH]. 
 62. Adopted by the United Nations in 1966 and ratified in 1976, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires state parties to protect a set of civil and 
political rights, and establishes a forum, the Human Rights Committee, to hear alleged 
violations of these rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Hare, supra note 61, at 63–64. 
 63. Adopted by the United Nations in 1965 and ratified in 1969, the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination seeks to “prevent 
and combat racist doctrines and practices in order to promote understanding between 
races and to build an international community free from all forms of racial segregation 
and racial discrimination.” International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
 64. Adopted in 2003 and entered into force in 2006, the Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of Racist and Xeno-
phobic Nature Through Computer Systems seeks to “harmonise substantive law provi-
sions concerning the fight against racist and xenophobic propaganda” and acknowledges 
that “computer systems offer an unprecedented means of facilitating freedom of expres-
sion and communication around the globe.” Additional Protocol to the Convention on 
Cybercrime Concerning the Criminalization of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature 
Committed through Computer Systems, Jan. 28, 2003, E.T.S. No. 189 [hereinafter Addi-
tional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime], available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/189.htm. 
 65. Status of Treaties: ECHR, COUNCIL OF EUROPE TREATY OFF., 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTableauCourt.asp?MA=3&CM=16&CL
=ENG (last visited May 22, 2012); Status of Treaties: ICERD, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); Status of Treaties: ICCPR, U.N. 
TREATY COLLECTION, 
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The European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) protects free-
dom of expression, but also recognizes the government’s power to inter-
fere with this right.66 Article 10 of the ECHR provides that, “Everyone 
has the right to freedom of expression.”67 However, this right may be 
limited: 
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for pre-
venting the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.68 
Hate speech regulation is considered a means of preventing disorder or 
crime.69 
According to the ECHR jurisprudence, the enforcement of hate speech 
regulations often turns on whether the regulation is necessary in a de-
mocratic society.70 The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) 
applies a proportionality interest test, and the protection granted varies 
with the type of speech sought to be limited.71 In Jersild v. Denmark, a 
                                                                                                         
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 29, 2012). 
 66. Hare, supra note 61, at 65–68. 
 67. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms [ECHR] art. 10, § 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. The goals of freedom of 
expression include promoting access to the exchange of information and ideas, allowing 
individuals to express themselves and participate in a public forum, granting the public 
the ability to monitor authorities through the “public watchdog” function, and promoting 
social progress in general. DRAGOS CUCEREANU, ASPECTS OF REGULATING FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION ON THE INTERNET 9 (2008). 
 68. ECHR, supra note 67, art. 10, § 2. 
 69. CUCEREANU, supra note 67, at 9, 13, 16, 20, 31. According to Article 10 § 2 of the 
Convention, limitations to freedom of expression must be prescribed by law, pursue one 
of the enumerated aims, and necessary for maintaining a democratic society. Id. First, the 
interference must prescribed by law, which means that there must be some national law 
or international instrument that forms the basis for the limitation. Id. Second, the enumer-
ated aims that are legitimate include protection of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals, protection 
of reputation or rights of others, preventing disclosure of information received in confi-
dence, and maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Id. Finally, in de-
termining whether a limitation is necessary for maintaining a democratic society, three 
interests are balanced: the pressing social need of the limitation, the relevant and suffi-
cient reasons for the limitation, and the proportionality of a measure. Id. Proportionality 
involves considering suitability, whether there is a less restrictive alternative, a balancing 
of means and ends, and balancing the interests involved. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Thomas Bull, Freedom of Expression in Sweden: The Rule of Formalism, in 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH ABRIDGED? 79, 81 (Anine Kierulf & Helge Rønning eds., 2009). 
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television journalist appealed a conviction of aiding and abetting the dis-
semination of hate speech to the ECtHR.72 Jersild was charged after he 
produced a news report for the Danish Broadcasting Corporation on a 
gang of young racists who called themselves Greenjackets.73 In the re-
port, which was broadcast over a Sunday-night television program, 
members of the gang made derogatory and offensive remarks about im-
migrants and ethnic minorities in Denmark.74 The ECtHR found that the 
Danish Supreme Court had violated Jersild’s freedom of expression un-
der the ECHR.75 While the ECtHR found that the government’s actions 
were “prescribed by law” and did pursue “a legitimate aim,” the intrusion 
on Jersild’s Article 10 rights was not “necessary in a democratic soci-
ety.”76 In dicta, the ECtHR noted that prosecuting the speech of the 
Greenjackets would not violate Article 10.77 Thus, “[h]ate speech would 
be protected if it were part of a ‘serious’ discussion of societal issues, but 
not if it were the product of right-wing intolerance.”78 
In Prosecutor General v. Åke Ingemar Teodor Green, in which a pas-
tor was charged with hate speech made during a sermon, the outcome 
again turned on whether the prosecution of a pastor’s speech is necessary 
                                                                                                         
According to Thomas Bull, “Political speech is at the core of the protected area, as it is of 
great public interest, while obscene and defamatory expressions are at the outer edge.” Id. 
 72. Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) ¶ 12 (1995). 
 73. Id. ¶¶ 12–14. 
 74. Id. ¶ 11. These comments characterized blacks as an inferior race, applauded the 
Ku Klux Klan in America and advocated for a return to slavery. Id. On the local level, the 
Danish Supreme Court had held that in contacting the members and arranging their inter-
views, Jersild knew the members would make racist assertions, and in fact, encouraged 
them to. Id. ¶18. Thus, Jersild, in effect, caused the racist assertions to be made. Id. The 
court noted that their judgment did not prevent the reporting of extremist views, but that 
this reporting must be balanced and comprehensive. Id. Thus, freedom of expression 
would not override the interests of the hate speech legislation, when four to five hours of 
interview tape was cut down to only a few minutes of the most crude comments made by 
extreme racists. Id. 
 75. Id. ¶ 11. Emphasizing the media’s important role as a “public watchdog,” the 
Court found that the journalist did not intend to disseminate racism, but rather to bring a 
serious issue to the public’s attention. Id. ¶¶ 35–36. 
 76. Jean-Marie Kamatali, The U.S. First Amendment Versus Freedom of Expression 
in Other Liberal Democracies and How Each Influenced the Development of Interna-
tional Law on Hate Speech, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 721, 727 (2010) (discussing the court’s 
holding in relation to international hate crime legislation). Specifically, the Court found 
that the means of the interference was not proportionate to the interest. Jersild, 298 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser A) ¶ 15. 
 77. Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) ¶ 31. The conviction of the Greenjackets had 
not been appealed to the European Court, and thus their ruling was limited to the televi-
sion producer of the television program. Id. ¶¶ 31, 37. 
 78. Bull, supra note 71, at 81. 
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in a democratic society.79 The Supreme Court of Sweden (“the Swedish 
Court”) noted that while religious sermons presented in a church will be 
afforded protection, there is “a duty to avoid, to the extent possible, 
statements that are unjustifiably insulting to others and constitute attacks 
on their rights. These statements therefore do not contribute to any form 
of public discourse that will lead to progress in relations among peo-
ple.”80 Ultimately, the Swedish Court found that in context of a pastor 
preaching to a congregation, speech would be protected under Articles 9 
and 10 of the ECHR.81 However, the Swedish Court emphasized the re-
ligious context in which the statements were made,82 which is a distinc-
tion that can also be drawn between the protected realm of religious ser-
                                                                                                         
 79. Prosecutor General v. Åke Ingemar Teodor Green, Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] 
[Supreme Court] 2005-11-29 B1050-05 (Swed.), available at 
http://domstol.se/domstolar/hogstadomstolen/avgoranden/2005/dom_pa_engelska_B_105
0-05.pdf. Åke Ingemar Teodor Green was charged with agitation against a group on the 
basis of sexual orientation. Id. In Sweden, the law places a limit on the extent of free 
speech, in that racist speech can be prosecuted under criminal law. Id. Under Sweden’s 
Criminal Code, enraging conduct is also a crime. Bull, supra note 71, at 87 (citing 
BROTTSBALKEN [BRB] [CRIMINAL CODE] 16:16 (Swed.)). Enraging conduct is defined as 
“a person who is noisy in a public place or who otherwise publicly behaves in a manner 
apt to arouse public indigation.” BRB 16:16 (Swed.). In 2006, a Svea Court of Appeals 
upheld the criminal conviction of the parent of an ice hockey player, who during a youth 
game yelled the Swedish equivalent of, “Take that [racial expletive] off the ice.” Bull, 
supra note 71, at 81 n.34 (citing NJA, Svea Hovrätt [HovR] [Court of Appeal of Svea] 
2006-07-04 B8117-05 (Swed.)). In its opinion, the court focused on the effect of the 
speech on the young hockey players. NJA, HovR, 2006-07-04 B8117-05, at 3 (Swed.). In 
the opinion, freedom of expression was not considered to be a defense. Id. Additionally, 
Sweden’s Penal Code also prohibits inciting rebellion, “[a] person who orally, before a 
crowd or congregation of people, or in a publication distributed or issued for distribution, 
or in other message to the public, urges or otherwise attempts to entice people to commit 
a criminal act.” BRB 16:5 (Swed.). 
 80. Åke Ingemar Teodor Green, NJA 2005-11-29 B1050-05, at 13 (Swed.). 
 81. Id. The Court held: 
This even applies to his most extreme statement, in which he describes sexual 
abnormalities at a cancerous growth, as that statement, viewed in light of what 
he said in connection with this in his sermon, is not something that can be 
deemed to encourage or justify hatred of homosexuals. The way he expressed 
himself perhaps cannot be deemed that much more derogatory than the wording 
of the Bible verses in question, but must be viewed as extreme also when con-
sidering what he was preaching to his audience. He made his statements in a 
sermon to his congregation regarding a theme found in the Bible. 
Id. at 35–36. Moreover, the Swedish Court held that the use of “contempt” in the Swedish 
law needed to be read narrowly in order to comply with the European jurisprudence. Id. 
at 16. 
 82. Id. 
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mons and the unprotected online hate speech. Thus, in order to comply 
with the ECHR when regulating online hate speech, the government 
must not interfere with the right to discuss serious social issues or relig-
ious freedom. 
Under Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”), “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law.”83 In J.R.T. and W.G. Party v. Canada, the Human 
Rights Commission upheld the decision of the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission to curtail J.R.T.’s telephone facilities.84 J.R.T. provided a 
telephone service in which members of his party could call and listen to a 
prerecorded message, which warned “of the dangers of international fi-
nance and international Jewry leading the world into wars, unemploy-
ment and inflation and the collapse of world values and principles.”85 
The Human Rights Committee dismissed J.R.T.’s application, holding 
that “the opinions which Mr. T. seeks to disseminate through the tele-
phone system clearly constitute the advocacy of racial or religious hatred 
which Canada has an obligation under article 20 (2) of the Covenant to 
prohibit.”86 
Under Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Religious Discrimination (“CERD”), “State parties con-
demn all propaganda and all organizations . . . which attempt to justify or 
promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form.”87 In Jewish Com-
munity of Oslo et al. v. Norway,88 the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (“the CERD Committee”) considered a claim 
brought by a local Norwegian Jewish organization against Norway for 
violating Article 4 of the CERD.89 Norway’s highest court had dismissed 
a claim of hate speech against Terje Sjølie, the leader of a march held in 
                                                                                                         
 83. ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 20. 
 84. J.R.T. & W.G. Party v. Canada, Judgment, U.N. Human Rights Comm’n, 
Commc’n No. 104/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, at 25 (1984). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 231. 
 87. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Rational Discrimina-
tion [CERD] art. 4, Dec. 21, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
 88. In cases brought before the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion, a citizen or organization can bring a claim against his country for not complying 
with Article 4 of the CERD. Id. Thus in this case, the local Norwegian Jewish organiza-
tion brought a claim against Norway for failing to uphold Article 4 of the CERD. 
 89. Jewish Cmty. of Oslo v. Norway, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation, Commc’n No. 30/2003, ¶¶ 2.1, 2.7, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 (2005). 
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honor of Rudolf Hess.90 At the march, in which participants wore mili-
tary-like uniforms and made the Nazi salute, Sjølie made a speech ap-
plauding Hitler and Hess for “their principles and heroic efforts.”91 In 
holding that Norway violated Article 4, the CERD Committee found that, 
“the intent of article 4 is to fight racism at its roots; there is a causal link 
between hate speech of the type made by Mr. Sjølie, and serious violent 
racist acts.”92 The CERD Committee continued: 
Thus, to give the right to freedom of speech a more limited role in the 
context of article 4 does not deprive the due regard clause of significant 
meaning, all the more so since all international instruments that guaran-
tee freedom of expression provide for the possibility, under certain cir-
cumstances, of limiting the exercise of this right.93 
This strikes at the heart of the issue: the tension between freedom of 
speech and incendiary speech. The Scandinavian legal systems pride 
themselves on a liberal approach to freedom of speech.94 In fact, the 
Norwegian Constitution lists freedom of speech as an affirmative duty of 
the government.95 However, there is a distinction between open and hon-
est dialogue and speech that lends itself to hate, violence, and crime. The 
instruments of international law, to which the Scandinavian countries are 
signatories, uphold this distinction, allowing for freedom of expression to 
                                                                                                         
 90. Id. The Jewish Community of Oslo had appealed to the CERD Committee on the 
basis that in dismissing the charges against Sjolie, the Norwegian court’s decision, “con-
tributed to an atmosphere in which acts of racism, including acts of violence, are more 
likely to occur.” Id. ¶ 7.3. In response, Norway argued that Article 135(a) of the Norwe-
gian penal code, which bans racist propaganda, had to be considered “with due regard to 
the right of freedom of expression.” Id. ¶ 8.1. 
 91. Id. ¶ 2.1. In his speech, Sjølie stated, “Every day immigrants rob, rape and kill 
Norwegians, every day our people and country are being plundered and destroyed by the 
Jews, who suck our country empty of wealth and replace it with immoral and un-
Norwegian thoughts.” Id. 
 92. Id. ¶ 5.4. 
 93. Id. ¶ 10.5. 
 94. Bjørklund & Andersen, supra note 11, at 109 (citing Jørgen Würtz Sørensen, Der 
kom fremmede: Migration, Højkonjunktur, Kultursammenstød. Fremmedarbejderne i 
Danmark frem til 1970 [The foreigners arrived: migration, cultural clashes. Guest work-
ers in Denmark up to 1970] (Åarhus Univ., Working Paper for the Ctr. for Kultur-
forskning, 1988) (Den.) (“Official ideology has been one of tolerance and humanism 
even though earlier waves of small-scale immigration has often generated some unrest 
among ordinary people.”). 
 95. GRUNNLOVA [CONSTITUTION], § E, art. 100 (Nor.). Under Article 100, “It is the 
responsibility of the authorities of the State to create conditions that facilitate open and 
enlightened public discourse.” Id. 
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be “afforded a lower level of protection in cases of racist and hate 
speech.”96 
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime makes hate 
speech illegal, and thus ISPs must filter or block offending content.97 
Hate speech includes “racist, xenophobic, anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim and 
generally intolerant speech.”98 Many European countries, including 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, have already implemented fil-
tering systems to restrict illegal content.99 However, at present, these sys-
tems are mostly tailored to preventing the production and distribution of 
child pornography.100 More importantly, the systems are not advanced 
enough to filter out all hate speech, and thus they do not do enough to 
combat the proliferation of incendiary speech.101 
II. THE GAP BETWEEN THE INTERNET AS A GLOBAL MEDIUM AND THE 
REGULATION OF ILLEGAL ONLINE ACTIVITY 
A. Breivik’s Manifesto as an Example of the Gap between Internet as a 
Medium and the Failure of Regulation 
Brevik’s manifesto provides the link between the growing blogosphere 
of hate speech and his acts of terrorism. In his 1500-page manifesto, 
                                                                                                         
 96. Jewish Cmty. of Oslo v. Norway, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation, Commc’n No. 30/2003, ¶ 10.5, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 (2005). 
 97. Dawn C. Nunziato, How (Not) to Censor: Procedural First Amendment Values 
and Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1123, 1126 (2011) (providing an 
overview of global internet censorship). 
 98. CUCEREANU, supra note 67, at 34. The Council of Europe has defined racist and 
xenophobic materials as: 
any written material, any image or any other representation of ideas or theories, 
which advocates, promotes or incites hatred, discrimination or violence, against 
any individual or group of individuals, based on race, colour, descent or na-
tional or ethnic origin, as well as religion if used as a pretext for any of these 
factors. 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 64, art. 1. 
 99. Nunziato, supra note 97, at 1127. 
 100. Nordic Countries, OPENNET INITIATIVE, 
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_NordicCountries_2010.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2012). 
 101. Additionally, few bloggers who are inciting violence and promoting extremism 
are being charged for hate speech crimes, and when they are being charged, they are 
rarely convicted. Townsend & Traynor, supra note 6. For example, the leader of the 
Dutch Freedom Party, Geert Wilders, who—while not Scandinavian—advocated for the 
rewriting of the Dutch constitution to outlaw the “fascist” Qur’an in the Netherlands, has 
been tried and acquitted on hate speech charges. Id. 
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Breivik fears the effects of “cultural Marxism,” a movement he attributes 
to the spread of political correctness and multiculturalism.102 Breivik 
writes: 
Political Correctness is not at all about “being nice,” unless one thinks 
gulags are nice places. Political Correctness is Marxism, with all that 
implies: loss of freedom of expression, thought control, inversion of the 
traditional social order, and, ultimately, a totalitarian state.103 
While many of the activists cited in the manifesto have sought to dis-
tance themselves from the attacks,104 the extent to which their words fu-
eled Breivik cannot be understated. Marc Sageman, a former CIA offi-
cer, described the anti-Muslim and anti-Jihad blogosphere as “the infra-
structure from which Breivik emerged.”105 As two prominent Norwegian 
writers put it: “The racism and bigotry that have simmered for years on 
anti-Islamic and anti-immigration Web sites in Norway and other Euro-
pean countries and in the United States made it possible for him to be-
lieve he was acting on behalf of a community that would thank him.”106 
Or as one of Breivik’s acquaintances recently stated in a radio interview: 
He [Breivik] felt a sort of desperation, resignation, and panic for the fu-
ture . . . He saw that there was a big conflict coming, and he didn’t 
want Europe to erupt in flames—or however you call these struggles. 
And he understood that something was about to go wrong, and obvi-
ously, it is going wrong.107 
While many have drawn parallels between Breivik and Ted Kacyzn-
ski,108 Breivik does not fit neatly into the mold of the “lone wolf” theory 
                                                                                                         
 102. ANDREW BERWICK, 2083: A EUROPEAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 18 
(2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/60739170/2083-a-European-Declaration-
of-Independence. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Scott Shane, Killings Spotlight Anti-Muslim Thought in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/us/25debate.html?pagewanted=all. Pamela 
Geller, a vociferous critic of Islam, wrote on her blog, “If anyone incited him to violence, 
it was Islamic supremacists.” Id. 
 105. Strømmen, supra note 44. 
 106. Kulish, supra note 13 (quoting Hajo Funke) (“This may be the act of a lone, mad, 
paranoid individual, but the far-right milieu creates an atmosphere that can lead such 
people down that path of violence.”). 
 107. Verlikgheten i P3: “Han gjorde i alla fall något,” SVERIGESRADIO (Oct. 11, 
2011), http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=3052&artikel=4742251 (inter-
view by Magnus Arvidson with Erik Walfridsson) (translated by the author). 
 108. Shane, supra note 104. In fact, Breivik’s manifesto included passages taken di-
rectly from Kaczynski’s 1995 manifesto, only making minor alterations including substi-
tuting terms like “leftists” with his own “multiculturalists” or “cultural Marxists.” Id. 
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of terrorism.109 Anders Behring Breivik was not merely a deranged per-
son whose political views had taken an extreme turn,110 but rather he was 
the product of the blogosphere of hate from which he recognized—and 
answered—a call to arms.111 As a prominent Norwegian writer stated, 
“Indeed, like many of the violent jihadists he so feared—though, notably, 
did not directly target—Breivik seems to have been radicalized via the 
Internet.”112 Even though Kaczynski quoted heavily from other scholars 
who criticized technological advances, including Adolphus Huxley’s 
Brave New World, Kaczynski’s work appears a reflection of his own 
troubled mind and his conscious decision to sequester himself from soci-
ety.113 Breivik, on the other hand, remained quite social,114 and it is this 
continued engagement in the online world that distinguishes him from 
the lone wolf theory. In fact, “the hatred and contempt from which he 
drew his deranged determination were shared with many others through 
the international right-wing blogosphere.”115 
Through online forums and discussion boards, Breivik frequently in-
teracted with other individuals sharing his xenophobic and racist be-
liefs.116 Lars Buehler, a Norwegian terrorist expert who had debated with 
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Brevik on one such forum, stated, “I was the single opposing voice, argu-
ing against the xenophobic, Islamaphobic postings and comments that 
were the norm on this page, and Breivik did not stand out with a particu-
larly aggressive or violent rhetoric. He was quite mainstream.”117 Breivik 
also reportedly warned others of the coming war against Muslims in 
Europe and was a member and participant in Nordisk, an online forum 
for neo-Nazis in the Nordic countries.118 
In his manifesto, Breivik cited heavily to a Norwegian blogger who 
operated under the pseudonym Fjordman.119 In one entry, Fjordman 
equated the spread of multiculturalism with a foreign invasion, and stated 
that “aiding and abetting a foreign invasion in any way constitutes Trea-
son.”120 Fjordman continued, “If non-Europeans have the right to resist 
colonisation and desire self-determination then Europeans have that 
right, too. And we intend to exercise it.”121 In another cited section, 
Fjordman blames the “feminisation” of Europe for the current state of 
affairs: 
Didn’t feminists always claim that the world would be a better place 
with women in the driver’s seat, because they wouldn’t sacrifice their 
own children? Well, isn’t that exactly what they are doing now? Smil-
ing and voting for parties that keep the doors open to Muslim immigra-
tion, the same Muslims who will be attacking their children tomor-
row?122 
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By characterizing Muslim immigrants as having the potential of attack-
ing Norwegian children and instilling fear in his readers, Fjordman’s 
words appear as a call to arms to his countrymen. On July 22, 2011, An-
ders Behring Breivik answered that call. Because Breivik believed an 
attack on Norwegians was imminent and his countrymen could no longer 
be trusted to protect the country, he carried out a massacre leaving sev-
enty-seven dead. If the proper measures were in place regulating hate 
speech on the Internet, Breivik would not have been engulfed in such a 
whirlwind of insidious ideas, and the attacks might have been prevented. 
The lack of content filtering has led to a plethora of misinformation and 
dangerous rhetoric, which, combined with a society already on edge, 
poses a serious threat to democracy. 
B. The Internet as a Global Medium 
Inherent to the discussion of the proliferation of hate speech online is 
the difference between the speed of information across the Internet and 
previous means of distributing political speech of decades past. Given 
the speed with which the Internet allows users to acquire and distribute 
data, information costs have greatly decreased, “to nearly zero.”123 In the 
context of online hate speech, information costs refer to the ease with 
which a user can create, acquire, or distribute illegal materials through 
the Internet.124 According to the Council of Europe, “the emergence of 
international communication networks like the Internet provide certain 
persons with modern and powerful means to support racism and xeno-
phobia and enables them to disseminate easily and widely expressions 
containing such ideas.”125 
Because certain media, like television, provide the user with a height-
ened sensory experience, that particular medium should be considered in 
determining the effect of hate speech.126 This view comports with inter-
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Id. at 59. 
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 124. Id. 
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national hate speech jurisprudence, which considers the types of harm in 
context.127 According to the Canadian Supreme Court, “The courts must 
determine as best they can what the community would tolerate others 
being exposed to on the basis of the degree of harm that may flow from 
such exposure.”128 While this statement was made in reference to a case 
involving pornography coming into the hands of minors, the notion that 
harmful content should be evaluated in its context is especially relevant 
to online hate speech.129 
Given the speed of technology and Internet as a global medium, harm-
ful online content similarly must be considered in context.130 Because 
modern computer technology offers a way to connect quickly, cheaply, 
and anonymously over the Internet, users enjoy a greater sense of free-
dom of expression.131 “The Internet is regarded as the key platform for 
the dissemination and mediation of the culture of violent extremism.”132 
Thus, it is important to consider the Internet as a medium in that, 
“[a]nonymous forums on the Internet have allowed anti-Muslim bigots to 
connect and reinforce each other’s worldview.”133 
III. SWEDEN’S LAW BANNING HATE SPEECH SHOULD BE ENFORCED 
AGAINST PERPETRATORS IN THE ONLINE COMMUNITY AND EXTENDED 
TO ALL CONTENT TRAVELING ALONG SWEDEN’S INTERNET 
INFRASTRUCTURE. 
In order to prevent further violence, the Swedish government should 
enforce its current law regarding hate speech to all online acts committed 
using Swedish ISPs. Sweden’s telecommunications infrastructure, and 
geographic location in the center of Scandinavia, provides a unique and 
extraordinary opportunity for Sweden to assume a leading role in hate 
speech filtering. Almost all international electronic communications traf-
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fic both into and out of Norway and Finland cross through Sweden.134 
Additionally, a great deal of Norwegian domestic communications trav-
els through the Swedish telecommunications infrastructure.135 Following 
the rationale provided for the Försvarets radioanstalt (“FRA Law”),136 the 
Swedish legislature could extend their hate speech laws to restrict the 
dissemination of all hate speech, which passes over their borders and 
which is controlled using their Internet infrastructure.137 By following a 
similar approach to the filtering of child pornography, terrorism, and ra-
cism in France,138 the proposed measure would establish a quasi-
autonomous nongovernmental organization that would monitor offensive 
content online.139 
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The organization’s role would be two-fold: it would maintain an online 
forum in which other users could report offensive content, and once iden-
tified, the organization would notify Internet ISPs to block access to the 
flagged content. For instance, a user could flag a posting in which sup-
porters of multiculturalists were called “traitors to their country.” Once 
reported, the organization would make a record of the comment so that 
prosecutors might identify and hold liable for hate speech the writer or 
poster of the comment. More importantly, however, the ISPs would filter 
out or block the content on the page to prevent the further distribution of 
this illegal content. In order to ensure that users do not abuse the system 
and report non-offensive materials in an attempt to have it filtered, the 
organization would have some oversight to ensure that material qualifies 
as illegal hate speech. 
As one prominent Internet Law scholar stated, “Restricting Internet in-
formation is a policy question about choosing among multiple regulatory 
endpoints that are both possible and legitimate.”140 By making it more 
difficult to post and maintain content without being filtered, the Swedish 
government can increase these information costs, and in the process, in-
hibit the proliferation of hate speech over the Internet.141 Delegated en-
forcement already plays a major role in hate speech regulation through-
out Europe. Google filters its search results to comply with French and 
German law, particularly in the realm of filtering out Nazi-related 
speech.142 Moreover, governmental pressure on the ISPs to comply with 
filtering, as well as public support for the program, would likely be im-
portant factors in the program’s success. In 2006, British ISPs agreed to 
block child pornography on a “voluntary” basis, after Parliament threat-
ened to pass unfavorable legislation if they did not comply.143 Similarly, 
many major Swedish newspapers have reacted favorably to media pres-
sure to moderate online commentary. For example, Aftonbladet, a major 
Swedish newspaper, will no longer allow anonymous comments on their 
website.144 While this may be in part due to pending enforcement of 
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Sweden’s Act on Responsibility for Electronic Bulletin Boards, in which 
media forums have an obligation to erase certain messages,145 it does 
foreshadow a favorable outcome to political pressure on online forums. 
Moreover, a government’s requirement of filtering by ISPs forces pri-
vate enforcement in some cases. For instance, in 2000, a French court 
ordered Yahoo, “to take all necessary measures to dissuade and render 
impossible any access via Yahoo.com to the Nazi artifact auction service 
and to any other site or service that may be construed as constituting an 
apology for Nazism or a contesting of Nazi crimes.”146 While the judg-
ment is still valid in France, enforcement of the judgment in the United 
States became moot after Yahoo abruptly stopped trafficking in Nazi 
memorabilia.147 However, the reach of adjudicative jurisdiction did have 
an effect on the development of technology and the use of greater filter-
ing devices for other international commercial sellers.148 
CONCLUSION 
Anders Behring Breivik’s 1,518-page manifesto reflects the perfect 
storm that was brewing for years in Scandinavia: a whirlwind of hatred 
and fear, coupled with minimal technological barriers and a high-speed 
Internet connection. To borrow from George Orwell, “walls of hatred 
and lies” separate the user from the truth.149 With the ever-expanding 
capability of the search engine and the limitless volume of user-
generated content, preconceived notions are no longer refuted, but fur-
ther solidified. Researching political viewpoints can be guided by one’s 
own tailored search terms, and virtually any viewpoint can find traction 
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by someone, somewhere in the blogosphere. Given the speed of the In-
ternet, the nature of trans-border communications has changed.150 “The 
internet has become a fertile ground for hate groups, setting up websites 
to promote prejudice against a wide variety of groups.”151 Especially in 
Norway and Sweden, these hate groups are increasingly volatile, vocif-
erous, and gaining in numbers. These blogs and forums are not only con-
tributing to the breakdown of barriers between speech and action, but 
they are inciting violence. 
While some may argue that protecting extreme speech curbs intoler-
ance,152 hate speech regulation is necessary to maintain democratic soci-
ety in Scandinavia. A society cannot survive if it loses its basis as a 
“community of ideas,”153 or a conglomerate of agreed-upon social 
norms.154 The law must uphold these social norms: 
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That society means a “community of ideas”; without shared ideas on 
politics, morals, and ethics no society can exist . . . . For society is not 
something that is kept together physically; it is held by invisible bonds 
of common thought . . . . A common morality is part of the bondage. 
The bondage is part of the price of society; and mankind, which needs 
society, must pay its price.155 
Hate speech regulation serves an important role in upholding these so-
cial norms.156 When individuals promote hatred against other races, relig-
ions, or ethnic groups, they are violating social norms and threatening 
society. “To the extent that hate speech contributes its ugly perspective, 
it does double damage. It reinforces those stereotypical and historic 
prejudices and arguably silences all but the more stalwart of the minority 
members.”157 
To address the threat of future violence, the Swedish government 
should establish a filtering program to eliminate illegal content through a 
quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organization. Because hate speech 
is especially pernicious, the Swedish government should also require 
ISPs to filter all online hate speech traffic on its servers. The lesson to be 
gleaned from Breivik’s July 22nd attacks is clear: while the freedom of 
an open society is valuable, we must not be reticent of the risk of unfet-
tered, extreme speech. In a world with greater information costs, poten-
tial terrorists would not come across and collect incendiary materials 
with the same ease and gusto that Breivik did. 
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